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Abstract. Generalized property-directed reachability (GPDR) belongs
to the family of the model-checking techniques called IC3/PDR. It has
been successfully applied to software verification; for example, it is the
core of Spacer, a state-of-the-art Horn-clause solver bundled with Z3.
However, it has yet to be applied to hybrid systems, which involve a
continuous evolution of values over time. As the first step towards GPDR-
based model checking for hybrid systems, this paper formalizes HGPDR,
an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems, and proves its soundness.
We also implemented a semi-automated proof-of-concept verifier, which
allows a user to provide hints to guide verification steps.
Keywords: hybrid systems · property-directed reachability · IC3 ·model
checking · verification
1 Introduction
A hybrid system is a dynamical system that exhibits both continuous-time dy-
namics (called a flow) and discrete-time dynamics (called a jump). This combina-
tion of flows and jumps is an essential feature of cyber-physical systems (CPS), a
physical system governed by software. In the modern world where safety-critical
CPS are prevalent, their correctness is an important issue.
Model checking [14, 19] is an approach to guaranteeing hybrid system safety.
It tries to prove that a given hybrid system does not violate a specification by
abstracting its behavior and by exhaustively checking that the abstracted model
conforms to the specification.
In the area of software model checking, an algorithm called property-directed
reachability (PDR), also known as IC3, is attracting interest [5, 7, 12]. IC3/PDR
was initially proposed in the area of hardware verification; it was then trans-
ferred to software model checking by Cimatti et al. [10]. Its effectiveness for soft-
ware model checking is now widely appreciated. For example, the SMT solver
Z3 [29] comes with a Horn-clause solver Spacer [21] that uses PDR internally;
Horn-clause solving is one of the cutting-edge techniques to verify functional
programs [6, 8, 17] and programs with loops [6].
We propose a model checking method for hybrid automata [3] based on the
idea of PDR; the application of PDR to hybrid automata is less investigated com-
pared to its application to software systems. Concretely, we propose an adapta-
tion of a variant of PDR called generalized property-directed reachability (GPDR)
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proposed by Hoder and Bjørner [20]. Unlike the original PDR, which is special-
ized to jump-only automata-based systems, GPDR is parametrized over a map
over predicates on states (i.e., a forward predicate transformer); the detail of
the underlying dynamic semantics of a verified system is encapsulated into the
forward predicate transformer. This generality of GDPR enables the application
of PDR to systems outside the scope of the original PDR by itself; for example,
Hoder et al. [20] show how to apply GPDR to programs with recursive function
calls.
An obvious challenge in an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata is how
to deal with flow dynamics that do not exist in software systems. To this end,
we extend the logic on which the forward predicate transformer is defined so
that it can express flow dynamics specified by an ordinary differential equation
(ODE). Our extension, inspired by the differential dynamic logic (dL) proposed
by Platzer [32], is to introduce continuous reachability predicates (CRP) of the
form 〈D | ϕI〉ϕ where D is an ODE and ϕI and ϕ are predicates. This CRP
is defined to hold under valuation σ if there is a continuous transition from σ
to certain valuation σ′ that satisfies the following conditions: (1) the continuous
transition is a solution of D, (2) the valuation σ′ makes ϕ true, and (3) ϕI is true
at every point on the continuous transition. With this extended logic, we define
a forward predicate transformer that faithfully encodes the behavior of a hybrid
automaton. We find that we can naturally extend GPDR to hybrid automata
by our predicate transformer.
We formalize our adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata, which we call
HGPDR. In the formalization, we define a forward predicate transformer that
precisely expresses the behavior of hybrid automata [3] using dL. We prove the
soundness of HGPDR. We also describe our proof-of-concept implementation
of HGPDR and show how it verifies a simple hybrid automaton with human
intervention.
In order to make this paper self-contained, we detail GPDR for discrete-time
systems before describing our adaptation to hybrid automata. After fixing the
notations that we use in Section 2, we define a discrete-time transition system
and hybrid automata in Section 3. Section 4 then reviews the GPDR procedure.
Section 5 presents HGPDR, our adaptation of GPDR to hybrid automata, and
states the soundness of the procedure. We describe a proof-of-concept implemen-
tation in Section 6. After discussing related work in Section 7, we conclude in
Section 8.
For readability, several definitions and proofs are presented in the appen-
dices.
2 Preliminary
We write R for the set of reals. We fix a finite set V := {x1, . . . , xN} of variables.
We often use primed variables x′ and x′′. The prime notation also applies to a
set of variables; for example, we write V ′ for {x′1, . . . , x
′
N}. We use metavariable
x for a finite sequence of variables. We write Fml for the set of quantifier-free
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first-order formulas over V ∪V ′ ∪V ′′; its elements are ranged over by ϕ. We call
elements of the set Σ : =(V ∪ V ′ ∪ V ′′) → R a valuations ; they are represented
by metavariable σ. We use the prime notation for valuations. For example, if
σ ∈ V → R, then we write σ′ for {x′1 7→ σ(x1), . . . , x
′
N 7→ σ(xN )}. We write
σ[x 7→ r] for the valuation obtained by updating the entry for x in σ with r. We
write σ |= ϕ if σ is a model of ϕ; σ 6|= ϕ if σ |= ϕ does not hold; |= ϕ if σ |= ϕ
for any σ; and 6|= ϕ if there exists σ such that σ 6|= ϕ. We sometimes identify a
valuation σ with a logical formula
∧
x∈V x = σ(x).
3 State-transition systems and verification problem
We review the original GPDR for discrete-time systems [20] in Section 4 before
presenting our adaptation for hybrid systems in Section 5. This section defines
the models used in these explanations (Section 3.1 and 3.2) and formally states
the verification problem that we tackle (Section 3.3).
3.1 Discrete-time state-transition systems (DTSTS)
We model a discrete-time program by a state-transition system.
Definition 3.1. A discrete-time state-transition system (DTSTS) is a tuple
〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉. We use metavariable SD for DTSTS. Q = {q0, q1, q2, . . .} is a
set of locations. q0 is the initial location. ϕ0 is the formula that has to be satis-
fied by the initial valuation. δ ⊆ Q×Fml×Fml×Q is the transition relation.
We write 〈q, σ1〉 →δ 〈q′, σ2〉 if 〈q, ϕ, ϕc, q′〉 ∈ δ where σ1 |= ϕ and σ1 ∪ σ′2 |= ϕc;
we call relation →δ the jump transition. A run of a DTSTS 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉 is a
finite sequence
〈
q0, σ0
〉
,
〈
q1, σ1
〉
, . . . ,
〈
qN , σN
〉
where (1) q0 = q0, (2) σ0 |= ϕ0,
and (3)
〈
qi, σi
〉
→δ
〈
qi+1, σi+1
〉
for any i ∈ [0, N − 1].
〈q, ϕ, ϕc, q′〉 ∈ δ intuitively means that, if the system is at the location q with
valuation σ1 and σ1 |= ϕ, then the system can make a transition to the location
q′ and change its valuation to σ′2 such that σ1 ∪ σ
′
2 |= ϕc. We call ϕ the guard
of the transition. ϕc is a predicate over V ∪ V ′ that defines the command of the
transition; it defines how the value of the variables may change in this transition.
The elements of V represent the values before the transition whereas those of
V ′ represent the values after the transition.
Example 3.2. Figure 1 is an example of a DTSTS that models a program to
compute the value of 1 + · · · + x; Q := {q0, q1} and ϕ0 := x ≥ 0 ∧ sum = 0.
In the transition from q0 to q0, the guard is x > 0; the command is
sum′ = sum + x ∧ x′ = x − 1. In the transition from q0 to q1, the guard is
x ≤ 0; the command is x′ = x ∧ sum′ = sum because this transition does
not change the value of x and sum. Therefore, the transition relation δ =
{〈q0, x > 0, sum′ = sum+ x ∧ x′ = x− 1, q0〉 , 〈q0, x ≤ 0, x′ = x ∧ sum′ = sum, q1〉}.
The finite sequence 〈q0, {x 7→ 3, sum 7→ 0}〉 , 〈q0, {x 7→ 2, sum 7→ 3}〉 ,
〈q0, {x 7→ 1, sum 7→ 5}〉 , 〈q0, {x 7→ 0, sum 7→ 6}〉 , 〈q1, {x 7→ 0, sum 7→ 6}〉 is a
run of the DTSTS figure 1.
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q0x ≥ 0 ∧ sum = 0 q1
x > 0 ∧ sum′ = sum+ x ∧ x′ = x− 1
x ≤ 0
Fig. 1. An example of DTSTS
3.2 Hybrid automaton (HA)
We model a hybrid system by a hybrid automaton (HA) [3]. We define an HA
as an extension of DTSTS as follows.
Definition 3.3. A hybrid automaton (HA) is a tuple 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉. The
components Q, q0, ϕ0, and δ are the same as Definition 3.1. We use metavariable
SH for HA. F is a map from Q to ODE on V that specifies the flow dynamics
at each location; inv is a map from Q to Fml that specifies the stay condition3
at each state.
A state of a hybrid automaton is a tuple 〈q, σ〉. A run of 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉
is a sequence of states 〈q0, σ0〉 〈q1, σ1〉 . . . 〈qn, σn〉 where σ0 |= ϕ0. The system
is allowed to make a transition from 〈qi, σi〉 to 〈qi+1, σi+1〉 if (1) σi reaches a
valuation σ′ along with the flow dynamics specified by F (qi), (2) inv(qi) holds
at every point on the flow, and (3) 〈qi, σ
′〉 can jump to 〈qi+1, σi+1〉 under the
transition relation δ. In order to define the set of runs formally, we need to define
the continuous-time dynamics that happens within each location.
Definition 3.4. Let D be an ordinary differential equation (ODE) on V and let
x1(t), . . . , xn(t) be a solution of D where t is the time. Let us write σ(t) for the
valuation {x1 7→ x1(t), . . . , xn 7→ xn(t)}. We write σ→D,ϕ σ′ if (1) σ = σ(0) and
(2) there exists t′ ≥ t such that σ′ = σ(t
′) and σ(t
′′) |= ϕ for any t′′ ∈ (0, t′]. We
call relation →D,ϕ the flow transition.
q0
x˙ = −y
y˙ = x
y ≥ 0
q1
x˙ = −y
y˙ = x
y ≤ 0
y ≤ 0
y ≥ 0
Fig. 2. An example of a
hybrid automaton.
Intuitively, the relation σ→D,ϕ σ′ means that
there is a trajectory from the state represented by σ
to that represented by σ′ such that (1) the trajectory
is a solution of D and (2) ϕ holds at any point on the
trajectory. For example, let D be x˙ = v, v˙ = 1, where x
and v are time-dependent variables; x˙ and v˙ are their
time derivative. The solution of D is v = t + v0 and
x = t
2
2 +v0t+x0 where t is the elapsed time, x0 is the initial value of x, and v0 is
the initial value of v. Therefore, {x 7→ 0, v 7→ 0}→D,true
{
x 7→ 12 , v 7→ 1
}
holds
because (x, v) = (12 , 1) is the state at t = 1 on the above solution with x0 = 0
3 We use the word ”stay condition” instead of the standard terminology ”invariant”
following Kapur et al. [23]
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and v0 = 0. {x 7→ 0, v 7→ 0}→D,x≥0
{
x 7→ 12 , v 7→ 1
}
also holds because the con-
dition x ≥ 0 continues to hold along with the trajectory from (x, v) = (0, 0) to
(12 , 1). However, {x 7→ 0, v 7→ 0}→D,x≥ 14
{
x 7→ 12 , v 7→ 1
}
does not hold because
the condition x ≥ 14 does not hold for the initial
1√
2
seconds in this trajectory.
Using this relation, we can define a run of an HA as follows.
Definition 3.5. A finite sequence
〈
q0, σ0
〉
,
〈
q1, σ1
〉
, . . . ,
〈
qN , σN
〉
is called a
run of an HA 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉 if (1) q0 = q0, (2) σ0 |= ϕ0, (3) for any i, if 0 ≤
i ≤ N − 2, there exists
〈
qi, ϕi, ϕ
i
c, q
i+1
〉
∈ δ and σI such that σi→F (qi),inv(qi) σ
I
and σI |= ϕi and
〈
qi, σI
〉
→δ
〈
qi+1, σi+1
〉
, and (4) σN−1→F (qN−1),inv(qN−1) σN .
Remark 3.6. This definition is more complicated than that of runs of DTSTS
because we need to treat the last transition from
〈
qN−1, σN−1
〉
to
〈
qN , σN
〉
dif-
ferently than the other transitions. Each transition from
〈
qi, σi
〉
to
〈
qi+1, σi+1
〉
,
if 0 ≤ i ≤ N − 2, is a flow transition followed by a jump transition; however, the
last transition consists only of a flow transition.
Example 3.7. Figure 2 shows a hybrid automaton with Q := {q0, q1} schemati-
cally. Each circle represents a location q; we write F (q) for the ODE associated
with each circle. Each edge between circles represents a transition; we present
the guard of the transition on each edge. We omit the ϕc part; it is assumed to
be the do-nothing command represented by ∧x∈V x′ = x.
Both locations are equipped with the same flow that is the anticlockwise
circle around the point (x, y) = (0, 0) on the xy plane. The system can stay at
q0 as long as y ≥ 0 and at q1 as long as y ≤ 0. y = 0 holds whenever a transition
is invoked. Indeed, for example, inv(q0) = y ≥ 0 and the guard from q0 to q1 is
y ≤ 0; therefore, when the transition is invoked, inv(q0) ∧ y ≤ 0 holds, which is
equivalent to y = 0.
Starting from the valuation σ0 := {x 7→ 1, y 7→ 0} at location q0, the system
reaches σ1 := {x 7→ −1, y 7→ 0} by the flow F (q0) along which inv(q0) ≡ y ≥ 0
continues to hold; then the transition from q0 to q1 is invoked. After that, the sys-
tem reaches σ2 := {x 7→ 0, y 7→ −1} by F (q1). Therefore, 〈q0, σ0〉 〈q1, σ1〉 〈q1, σ2〉
is a run of this HA.
3.3 Safety verification problem
Definition 3.8. We say that σ is reachable in DTSTS SD (resp., HA SH)
if there is a run of SD (resp., SH) that reaches 〈q, σ〉 for some q. A safety
verification problem (SVP) for a DTSTS 〈SD, ϕ〉 (resp., HA 〈SH , ϕ〉) is the
problem to decide whether σ′ |= ϕ holds for all the reachable valuation σ′ of the
given SD (resp., SH).
If an SVP is affirmatively solved, then the system is said to be safe; otherwise,
the system is said to be unsafe. One of the major strategies for proving the safety
of a system is discovering its inductive invariant.
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Definition 3.9. – Let 〈SD, ϕP 〉 be an SVP for DTSTS where SD =
〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉. Then, a function R :Q → Fml is called an inductive invari-
ant if (1) |= ϕ0 =⇒ R(q0); (2) if σ |= R(q) and 〈q, σ〉 →δ 〈q′, σ′〉, then
σ′ |= R(q′); and (3) |= R(q) =⇒ ϕP for any q.
– Let 〈SH , ϕP 〉 be an SVP for HA where SH = 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉. Then,
a function R :Q → Fml is called an inductive invariant if (1) |= ϕ0 =⇒
R(q0); (2) if σ |= R(q) and 〈q, σ〉→F (q),inv(q) 〈q
′′, σ′′〉 and 〈q′′, σ′′〉 →δ 〈q′, σ′〉,
then σ′ |= R(q′); and (3) |= R(q) =⇒ ϕP for any q.
Unsafety can be proved by discovering a counterexample.
Definition 3.10. Define SD, ϕP , and SH as in Definition 3.9. A run 〈σ0, q0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN 〉
of SD (resp. SH) is called a counterexample to the SVP 〈SD, ϕP 〉 (resp. 〈SH , ϕP 〉)
if σN |= ¬ϕP .
GPDR is a procedure that tries to find an inductive invariant or a coun-
terexample to a given SVP. SVP is in general undecidable. Therefore, the orig-
inal GPDR approach [20] and our extension with hybrid systems presented in
Section 5 do not terminate for every input.
4 GPDR for DTSTS
Before presenting our extension of GPDR with hybrid systems, we present the
original GPDR procedure by Hoder and Bjørner [20] in this section. (The GPDR
presented here, however, is slightly modified from the original one; see Re-
mark 4.4.)
Given a safety verification problem 〈SD, ϕP 〉 where SD = 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉,
GPDR tries to find (1) an inductive invariant to prove the safety of SD, or
(2) a counterexample to refute the safety. To this end, GPDR (nondetermin-
istically) manipulates a data structure called configurations. A configuration is
either Valid, ModelM , or an expression of the form M || R0, . . . , RN ;N . We
explain each component of the expression M || R0, . . . , RN ;N in the following.
(Valid and ModelM are explained later.)
– R0, . . . , RN is a finite sequence of maps from Q to Fml (i.e., elements of
Fml). Each Ri is called a frame. The frames are updated during an execu-
tion of GPDR so that Ri(qj) is an overapproximation of the states that are
reachable within i steps from the initial state in SD and whose location is
qj .
– N is the index of the last frame.
– M is a finite sequence of the form 〈σi, qi, i〉 , 〈σi, qi, i+ 1〉 , . . . , 〈σN , qN , N〉.
This sequence is a candidate partial counterexample that starts from the
one that is i-step reachable from the initial state and that ends up with a
state 〈σN , qN 〉 such that σN |= ¬ϕP . Therefore, in order to prove the safety
of SD, a GPDR procedure needs to prove that 〈qi, σi〉 is unreachable within
i steps from an initial state.
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In order to formalize the above intuition, GPDR uses a forward predicate
transformer determined by SD. In the following, we fix an SVP 〈SD, ϕP 〉.
Definition 4.1. F(R)(q′), where F is called the forward predicate transformer
determined by SD, is the following formula:
(q′ = q0 ∧ ϕ0) ∨
∨
(q,ϕ,ϕc,q′)∈δ
∃x′′.
(
[x′′/x]R(q)
∧ [x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc
)
,
where x′′ is the sequence x′′1 , . . . , x′′N .
Notice that F(λq.false) is equivalent to ϕ0. Intuitively, σ′ |= F(R)(q′) holds
if 〈q′, σ′〉 is an initial state (i.e., q′ = q0 and σ′ |= ϕ0) or 〈q′, σ′〉 is reachable
in 1-step transition from a state that satisfies R. The latter case is encoded by
the second disjunct of the above definition: The valuation σ′ satisfies the second
disjunct if there are q, ϕ, and ϕc such that (q, ϕ, ϕc, q
′) ∈ δ (i.e., q′ is 1-step after
q in δ) and there is a valuation σ such that σ |= R(q) ∧ ϕ (i.e., σ satisfies the
precondition R(q) and the guard ϕ) and σ′ is a result of executing command c
under σ.
The following lemma guarantees that F soundly approximates the transition
of an DTSTS.
Lemma 4.2. If σ1 |= R(q1) and 〈q1, σ1〉 →δ 〈q2, σ2〉, then σ2 |= F(R)(q2).
Proof. Assume σ1 |= R(q1) and 〈q1, σ1〉 →δ 〈q2, σ2〉. Then, by definition,
(q1, ϕ, ϕ
′, q2) ∈ δ and σ1 |= ϕ and σ1 ∪ σ′2 |= ϕc for some ϕ and ϕc.
σ′′1 ∪ σ2 |= [x
′′/x]R(q1) follows from σ1 |= R(q1). σ′′1 ∪ σ2 |= [x
′′/x]ϕ fol-
lows from σ1 |= ϕ. σ
′′
1 ∪ σ2 |= [x/x
′,x′′/x]ϕc follows from σ1 ∪ σ
′
2 |= ϕc.
Therefore, σ′′1 ∪ σ2 |= [x
′′/x]R(q1) ∧ [x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc. Hence, we have
σ2 |= ∃x′′.[x′′/x]R(q) ∧ [x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc as required.
By using the forward predicate transformer F , we can formalize the intuition
about configuration M ||R0, . . . , RN ;N explained so far as follows.
Definition 4.3. Let SD be 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉, F be the forward predicate transformer
determined by SD, and ϕP be the safety condition to be verified. A configura-
tion C is said to be consistent if it is (1) of the form Valid, (2) of the form
Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M , or (3) of the form M || R0, . . . , RN ;N that satisfies all of
the following conditions:
– (Con-A) R0(q0) = ϕ0 and R0(qi) = false if qi 6= q0;
– (Con-B) |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri+1(q) for any q;
– (Con-C) |= Ri(q) =⇒ ϕP for any q and i < N ;
– (Con-D) |= F(Ri)(q) =⇒ Ri+1(q) for any i < N and q;
– (Con-E) if 〈σ, q,N 〉 ∈M , then σ |= RN (q) ∧ ¬ϕP 4; and
– (Con-F) if 〈σ1, q1, i〉 , 〈σ2, q2, i+ 1〉 ∈ M and i < N , then 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ
and σ1, σ
′
2 |= Ri(q1) ∧ ϕ ∧ ϕc.
If C is consistent, we write Con(C).
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Initialize  ∅ || 〈R0 := F(λq.false);N := 0〉
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= R0(q) =⇒ ϕP
Valid M || A  Valid
if ∃i < N.∀q ∈ Q. |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q)
Unfold M || A  ∅ || A[RN+1 := λq.true;N := N + 1]
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= RN (q) =⇒ ϕP
Induction M || A  ∅ || A[Rj := λq.Rj(q) ∧ R(q)]i+1j=1
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= F(λq.Ri(q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q)
Candidate ∅ || A  〈σ, q, N〉 ||A
if σ |= RN (q) ∧ ¬ϕP
Decide 〈σ2, q2, i + 1〉M || A  〈σ1, q1, i〉 〈σ2, q2, i + 1〉M || A
if 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ andσ1, σ′2 |= Ri(q1) ∧ ϕ ∧ ϕc
Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M || A  Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M
Conflict
〈
σ′, q′, i + 1
〉
M || A  ∅ || A[Rj ← λq.Rj(q) ∧ R(q)]i+1j=1
if |= R(q′) =⇒ ¬σ′ and ∀q ∈ Q. |= F(Ri)(q) =⇒ R(q)
Fig. 3. The rules for the original PDR. Recall that ¬σ′ in the rule Conflict denotes
the formula ¬
(∧
x∈V
x = σ′(x)
)
.
The GPDR procedure rewrites a configuration following the (nondetermin-
istic) rewriting rules in Figure 3. We add a brief explanation below; for more
detailed exposition, see [20]. Although the order of the applications of the rules in
Figure 3 is arbitrary, we fix one scenario of the rule applications in the following
for explanation.
1. The procedure initializesM to ∅, R0 to F(λq.false), andN to 0 (Initialize).
2. If there are a valuation σ and a location q such that σ |= RN (q) ∧ ¬ϕP
(Candidate), then the procedure adds 〈σ, q,N〉 to M . The condition σ |=
RN (q) ∧ ¬ϕP guarantees that the state 〈q, σ〉 violates the safety condition
ϕP ; therefore, the candidate 〈σ, q,N〉 needs to be refuted. If not, then the
frame sequence is extended by setting N to N + 1 and RN+1 to λq.true
(Unfold); this is allowed since ∀q ∈ Q. |= RN (q) =⇒ ϕP in this case.
3. The discovered 〈q, σ〉 is backpropagated by successive applications ofDecide:
In each application of Decide, for 〈q2, σ2, i+ 1〉 inM , the procedure tries to
find σ and q such that 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ and σ1, σ′2 |= Ri(q1)∧ ϕ∧ ϕc where
σ′2 is the valuation obtained by replacing the domain of σ2 with their primed
counterpart. These conditions in combination guarantee 〈q1, σ1〉 →δ 〈q2, σ2〉
and σ1 |= Ri(q1).
(a) If this backpropagation reaches R0 (the rule Model), then it reports
the trace of the backpropagation returning Model M .
(b) If it does not reachR0, in which case there exists i such that σ
′∧F(Ri)(q′)
is not satisfiable, then we pick a frame R such that |= R(q′) =⇒ ¬σ′ and
|= F(Ri)(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q (the rule Conflict). Intuitively, R is a
frame that separates (1) the union of the initial states denoted by ϕ0 and
the states that are one-step reachable from a state denoted by Ri(q
′) and
4 We hereafter write 〈σ, q, i〉 ∈ M to express that the element 〈σ, q, i〉 exists in the
sequence M although M is a sequence, not a set.
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(2) the state denoted by 〈q′, σ′〉. In a GPDR term, R is a generalization
of ¬σ′. This formula is used to strengthen Rj for j ∈ {1, . . . , i+ 1}.
4. The frame R obtained in the application of the rule Conflict is propa-
gated forward by applying the rule Induction. The condition ∀q ∈ Q. |=
F(λq.Ri(q) ∧R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q) forces that R holds in the one-step transi-
tion from a states that satisfies Ri. If this condition holds, then R holds for
i+ 1 steps (Theorem 4.5); therefore, we conjoin R to R1(q), . . . , Ri+1(q). In
order to maintain the consistency conditions (Con-E) and (Con-F), this rule
clears M to the empty set to keep its consistency to the updated frames.5
5. If ∀q ∈ Q. |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q) for some i < N , then the verification
succeeds and Ri is an inductive invariant (Valid). If such i does not exist,
then we go back to Step 2.
Remark 4.4. One of the differences of the above GPDR from the original one [20]
is that ours deals with the locations of a given DTSTS explicitly. In the original
GPDR, information about locations are assumed to be encoded using a variable
that represents the program counter. Although such extension was proposed for
IC3 by Lange et al. [26], we are not aware of a variant of GPDR that treats
locations explicitely.
Soundness. We fix one DTSTS 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉 in this section. The correctness of
the GPDR procedure relies on the following lemmas.
Lemma 4.5. Con is invariant to any rule application of Figure 3.
Theorem 4.6. If the GPDR procedure is started from the rule Initialize and
leads to Valid, then the system is safe. If the GPDR procedure is started from the
rule Initialize and leads to Model 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉, then the system
is unsafe.
5 HGPDR
We now present our procedure HGPDR that is an adaptation of the original
GPDR to hybrid systems. An adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems requires
the following two challenges to be addressed.
1. The original definition of F (Definition 4.1) captures only a discrete-time
transition. In our extension of GPDR, we need a forward predicate trans-
former that can mention a flow transition.
2. A run of an HA (Definition 3.5) differs from that of DTSTS in that its last
transition consists only of flow dynamics; see Remark 3.6.
In order to address the first challenge, we extend the logic on which F is defined
to be able to mention flow dynamics and define F on the extended logic (Sec-
tion 5.1). To address the second challenge, we extend the configuration used by
5 We could filter M so that it is consistent for the updated frame. We instead discard
M here for simplicity.
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GPDR so that it carries an overapproximation of the states that are reachable
from the last frame by a flow transition; the GPDR procedure is also extended
to maintain this information correctly (Section 5.2).
5.1 Extension of forward predicate transformer
In order to extend F to accommodate flow dynamics, we extend the logic on
which F is defined with continuous reachability predicates (CRP) inspired by
the differential dynamic logic (dL) proposed by Platzer [33].
Definition 5.1. Let D be an ODE over Y := {y1, . . . , yk} ⊆ V . Let us write
σ for {y1 7→ e1, . . . , yk 7→ ek} and σ
′ for {y1 7→ e′1, . . . , yk 7→ e
′
k}. We define a
predicate 〈D | ϕ〉ϕ′ by: σ |= 〈D | ϕ〉ϕ′ iff. ∃σ′.σ→D,ϕ σ′ ∧ σ′ |= ϕ′. We call a
predicate of the form 〈D | ϕI〉ϕ a continuous reachability predicate (CRP).
Using the above predicate, we extend F as follows.
Definition 5.2. For an HA 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉, the forward predicate trans-
former FH(R)(q′) is the following formula:
(q′ = q0 ∧ ϕ0)∨∨
(q,ϕ,ϕc,q′)∈δ
∃x′′.
(
[x′′/x]R(q)
∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv (q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc)
)
.
In the above definition, [x′′/x]F (q) is the ODE obtained by renaming the vari-
ables x that occur in ODE F (q) with x′′.
We also define predicate FC(R)(q′) as follows:
∃x′′.([x′′/x]R(q′) ∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q′) | [x′′/x]inv(q′)〉x = x′′).
Intuitively, σ′ |= FH(ϕ)(q′) holds if either (1) 〈q′, σ′〉 is an initial state or (2) it
is reachable from R by a flow transition followed a jump transition. Similarly,
σ′ |= FC(R)(q′) holds if σ′ is reachable in a flow transition (not followed by
a jump transition) from a state denoted by R(q′). This definition of FH is an
extension of Definition 4.1 in that it encodes the ”flow-transition” part of the
above intuition by the CRP. In the case of FC, the postcondition part of the
CRP is x = x′′ because we do not need a jump transition in this case.
Lemma 5.3. If σ1 |= R(q1) and σ1→F (q1),inv(q1) σ
I and
〈
q1, σ
I
〉
→δ 〈q2, σ2〉,
then σ2 |= FH(R)(q2).
Proof. Assume (1) σ1 |= R(q1), (2) σ1→F (q1),inv(q1) σ
I , and (3)〈
q1, σ
I
〉
→δ 〈q2, σ2〉. Then, by definition, (4) (q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2) ∈ δ and
(5) σI |= ϕ and (6) σI ∪ σ′2 |= ϕc for some ϕ and ϕc. We show
∃x′′. ([x′′/x]R(q) ∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv(q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc)).
(5) implies (7) σI∪σ′2 |= ϕ. (6) and (7) imply (8) σ
I ′′∪σ′2 |= [x
′′/x]ϕ∧[x′′/x]ϕc.
(2) implies (9) σ′′1 →[x′′/x]F (q1),[x′′/x]inv(q1) σ
I ′′. Therefore, from (8) and (9), we
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Initialize  ∅ || 〈R0 := FH(λq.false);Rrem := λq.true;N := 0〉
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= R0(q) =⇒ ϕP
Valid M || A  Valid
if ∃i < N.∀q ∈ Q. |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q)
Unfold M || A  ∅ ||A[RN+1 := λq.true;Rrem := λq.true;N := N + 1]
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= Rrem(q) =⇒ ϕP
Induction M || A  ∅ ||A[Rj := λq.Rj(q) ∧R(q)]i+1j=1
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= FH(λq.Ri(q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q)
Decide 〈σ2, q2, i+ 1〉M || A  〈σ1, q1, i〉 〈σ2, q2, i+ 1〉M || A
if 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ andσ1, σ′2 |= Ri(q1) ∧ 〈F (q1) | inv(q1)〉(ϕ ∧ ϕc)
Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M || A  Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M
Conflict
〈
σ′, q′, i + 1
〉
M || A  ∅ ||A[Rj := λq.Rj(q) ∧R(q)]i+1j=1
if |= R(q′) =⇒ ¬σ′ and∀q ∈ Q. |= FH(Ri)(q) =⇒ R(q)
PropagateCont M || A  M || A[Rrem := λq.Rrem(q) ∧ R(q)]
if ∀q ∈ Q. |= RN (q) ∨ FC(RN )(q) =⇒ R(q)
CandidateCont ∅ || A  〈σ, q, rem〉 || A
if σ |= Rrem(q) ∧ ¬ϕP
DecideCont 〈σ2, q, rem〉 || A  〈σ1, q, N〉 〈σ2, q, rem〉 || A
if σ1, σ
′
2 |= RN (q) ∧ 〈F (q) | inv(q)〉(x = x′)
ConflictCont
〈
σ′, q′, rem
〉 || A  ∅ ||A[Rrem := λq.Rrem(q) ∧ R(q)]
if R(q′) =⇒ ¬σ′, and |= RN (q′) ∨ FC(RN )(q′) =⇒ R(q′)
Fig. 4. The rules for HGPDR.
have (10) σ′′1 ∪ σ2 |= 〈[x′′/x]F (q1) | [x′′/x]inv(q1)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x′′/x,x/x′]ϕc).
(Note that the variables in x′ appear only in ϕc.) σ
′′
1 ∪ σ2 |= [x
′′/x]R(q1)
follows from (1); therefore, we have σ′′1 ∪ σ2 |= [x
′′/x]R(q1) ∧
〈[x′′/x]F (q1) | [x′′/x]inv (q1)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x′′/x,x/x′]ϕc). This implies
∃x′′. ([x′′/x]R(q) ∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv(q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc))
as required.
Lemma 5.4. If σ1 |= R(q1) and σ1→F (q1),inv(q1) σ2, then σ2 |= FC(R)(q1).
Proof. Almost the same argument as the proof of Lemma 5.3.
5.2 Extension of GPDR
We present our adaptation of GPDR for hybrid systems, which we call
HGPDR. Recall that the original GPDR in Section 4 maintains a configura-
tion of the form M || R0, . . . , RN ;N . HGPDR uses a configuration of the form
M || R0, . . . , RN ;Rrem ;N . In addition to the information in the original config-
urations, we add Rrem which we call remainder frame. Rrem overapproximates
the states that are reachable from RN within one flow transition.
Figure 4 presents the rules for HGPDR. The rules from Initialize to
Conflict are the same as Figure 3 except that (1) Initialize and Unfold are
adapted so that they set the remainder frame to λq.true and (2) Candidate is
dropped. We explain the newly added rules.
– PropagateCont discovers a fact that holds in Rrem . The side condition
|= RN (q) ∨ FC(RN )(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q guarantees that R(q) is true at
the remainder frame; hence R is conjoined to Rrem .
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– CandidateCont replaces Candidate in the original procedure. It tries to
find a candidate from the frame Rrem . The candidate 〈q, σ〉 found here is
added to M in the form 〈σ, q, rem〉 to denote that 〈q, σ〉 is found at Rrem .
– DecideCont propagates a counterexample 〈σ′, q′, rem〉 found at Rrem to
the previous frame RN . This rule computes the candidate to be added to M
by deciding σ∪σ′ |= RN (q)∧〈F (q) | inv(q)〉(x = x′), which guarantees that
σ evolves to σ′ under the flow dynamics determined by F (q) and inv(q).
– Conflict uses FH instead of F in the original GPDR. As in the rule
Conflict in GPDR, the frame R in this rule is a generalization of ¬σ′
which is not backward reachable to Ri.
– ConflictCont is the counterpart of Conflict for the frame Rrem . This
rule is the same as Conflict except that it uses FC instead of FH; hence,
R separates σ′ from both the states denoted by ϕ0 and the states that are
reachable from Ri in a flow transition (not followed by a jump transition).
5.3 Soundness
In order to prove the soundness of HGPDR, we adapt the definition of Con in
Definition 4.3 for HGPDR.
Definition 5.5. Let SH be 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉, FH and FC be the forward pred-
icate transformers determined by SH , and ϕP be the safety condition to be veri-
fied. A configuration C is said to be consistent if it is Valid, Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M ,
or ConH(M || R0, . . . , RN ;Rrem ;N) that satisfies all of the following:
– (Con-A) R0(q0) = ϕ0 and R0(qi) = false if qi 6= q0;
– (Con-B-1) |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri+1(q) for any q and i < N ;
– (Con-B-2) |= RN (q) =⇒ Rrem(q) for any q;
– (Con-C) |= Ri(q) =⇒ ϕP if i < N ;
– (Con-D-1) |= FH(Ri)(q) =⇒ Ri+1(q) for any i < N and q;
– (Con-D-2) |= FC(RN )(q) =⇒ Rrem(q) for any q;
– (Con-E) if 〈σ, q, rem〉 ∈M , then σ |= Rrem(q) ∧ ¬ϕP ;
– (Con-F-1) if 〈σ1, q1, i〉 , 〈σ2, q2, i+ 1〉 ∈M and i < N , then 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ
and σ1, σ
′
2 |= Ri(q1) ∧ ϕ ∧ ϕc; and
– (Con-F-2) if 〈σ1, q1, N〉 , 〈σ2, q2, rem〉 ∈ M , then 〈q1, ϕ, ϕc, q2〉 ∈ δ and
σ1, σ
′
2 |= Ri(q1) ∧ ϕ ∧ ϕc.
The soundness proof follows the same strategy as that of the original GPDR.
Lemma 5.6. ConH is invariant to any rule application of Figure 4.
Theorem 5.7. If HGPDR is started from the rule Initialize and leads to
Valid, then the system is safe. If HGPDR is started from the rule Initialize
and leads to Model 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉 〈σrem , qrem , rem〉, then the system
is unsafe.
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Input: Hybrid automaton SH := 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉
Output: Model(M) if SH is unsafe; M is a witnessing trace. Valid(R) if SH is
safe; R is an inductive invariant.
// Initialize
1 N := 0; R0 := λq.(if q = q0 then ϕ0 else false)
2 R1 := true ; Rrem := true ; M := ∅
3 while true do
4 for q ∈ Q do
5 switch querySat(Rrem(q) ∧ ¬ϕP ) do
6 case Sat(σ′) do
// CandidateCont
7 M := 〈q, σ, rem〉
8 switch RemoveTrace(M , R0, . . . , RN , Rrem , N ) do
9 case Valid(R) do
10 return Valid(R)
11 case Cont(R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ) do
12 M := ∅
13 Update R0, . . . , RN , Rrem to the returned frames
14 case Model(M) do
15 return Model(M)
16 end
17 case Unsat do
// Unfold
18 M := ∅; RN+1 := λq.true ; Rrem := λq.true ; N := N + 1
19 end
20 end
21 end
Algorithm 1: Definition of DetHybridPDR.
5.4 Operational presentation of HGPDR
The definition of HGPDR in Figure 4 is declarative and nondeterministic. For
the sake of convenience of implementation, we derive an operational procedure
from HGPDR; we call the operational version DetHybridPDR, whose defini-
tion is in Algorithm 1.
Discharging verification conditions. An implementation of HGPDR needs to
discharge verification conditions during verification. In addition to verification
conditions expressed as a satisfiability problem of a first-order predicate, which
can be discharged by a standard SMT solver, DetHybridPDR needs to dis-
charge conditions including a CRP predicate. Specifically, DetHybridPDR
needs to deal with the following three types of problems.
– Checking whether δ := ψ ∧ 〈D | ϕI〉(∧x∈V x = σ′(x)) is satisfiable or not
for given first-order predicates ψ and ϕI , an ODE D, and a valuation σ′.
DetHybridPDR needs to discharge this type of predicates when it decides
which of DecideCont and ConflictCont should be applied if the top
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Input: Hybrid automaton SH := 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉; Trace of counterexamplesM ; Frames
R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ; Natural number N .
Output:
1 while M 6= ∅ do
2 if M =
〈
q′, σ′, rem
〉
M ′ then
3 switch querySatC(RN (q
′) ∧ 〈F (q′) | inv(q′)〉(x = σ′(x)) do
// DecideCont
4 case Sat(σ) do
5 M :=
〈
q′, σ,N
〉
M
// ConflictCont
6 case Unsat(R) do
7 M := ∅;Rrem := λq.Rrem(q) ∧R(q)
// PropagateCont
8 for ψ ∈ Formulas(RN (q′)) do
9 switch querySatC(RN (q
′) ∧ 〈F (q′) | inv(q′)〉¬ψ) do
10 case Unsat do
11 Rrem(q
′) := Rrem(q
′) ∧ ψ
12 end
13 end
14 end
15 else if M =
〈
q′, σ′, 0
〉
M ′ then
// Model
16 return Model(M)
17 else if M =
〈
q′, σ′, i
〉
M ′ and 0 < i 6= rem then
18 for
〈
q, ϕ, ϕc, q
′
〉 ∈ δ do
19 switch querySatC(Ri−1(q) ∧ 〈F (q) | inv(q)〉(ϕ ∧ ϕc ∧ x = σ′(x))) do
// Decide
20 case Sat(σ) do
21 M := 〈q, σ〉M
// Conflict
22 case Unsat(R) do
23 for j ∈ [1, i + 1] do
24 Rj := λq.Rj(q) ∧ R(q);M := ∅;
25 end
// Induction
26 for i ∈ [1, N − 1], ψ ∈ Formulas(Ri(q′)) do
27 switch querySatC(Ri(q
′) ∧ ψ ∧ 〈F (q′) | inv(q′)〉¬ψ) do
28 case Unsat do
29 Rj(q
′) := Rj(q
′) ∧ ψ for j ∈ [1, i+ 1]
30 end
31 end
32 end
33 end
34 end
35 end
36 if There exists i such that ∀q. |= Ri+1(q) =⇒ Ri(q) then
// Valid
37 return Valid(Ri)
38 else
// Inductive invariant is not reached yet.
39 return Cont(R0, . . . , RN , Rrem)
40 end
Algorithm 2: Definition of RemoveTrace.
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Input: Formula δ := ψ ∧ 〈D | ϕI〉(∧x∈V x = σ′(x)) to be discharged; Number T > 0.
Output: Sat(σi) if σi |= δ; Unsat(ψ′) if δ is unsatisfiable and ψ′ is a generalization of σ′;
aborts if satisfiability nor unsatisfiability is proved.
// D−1 is the time-inverted ODE of D. Therefore, p is the backward solution of D
from σ′.
1 D−1 := the ODE obtained by replacing all the occurrences of the variable t corresponding
to the time to −t and negating each time derivative;
2 Solve D−1 numerically from the initial point σ0 := σ′;
3 Let p := σ0σ1 . . . σT−1 be the solution obtained at the Step 2;
// i1 is set to ∞ if there is no such i.
4 i1 := the minimum i such that σj |= ϕI for any j < i and σi |= ψ;
// i2 is set to ∞ if there is no such i.
5 i2 := the minimum i such that σj |= ϕI for any j < i;
6 if i1 <∞ then
// σi1 witnesses the satisfiability of δ.
7 return Sat(σi1 )
8 else if i2 <∞ then
// σi2 is the end point of the D−1 with the stay condition ϕI, but σi2 6|= ψ.
Therefore, ψ is not backward reachable from σ′ along with D. Currently, the
user needs to provide a predicate that can be used for further refinement.
9 Obtain ψ′ such that |= ∃x0.[x0/x]ψ ∧ 〈[x0/x]D | [x0/x]ϕI〉x0 = x =⇒ ψ′ and
σ′ 6|= ψ′ from the user;
10 return Unsat(ψ′)
11 end
// Cannot conclude neither satisfiability nor unsatisfiabililty.
12 abort
Algorithm 3: Algorithm for discharging δ := ψ ∧ 〈D | ϕI〉(∧x∈V x = σ′(x)).
of M is 〈σ′, q′, rem〉. We use Algorithm 3 for discharging δ. This algorithm
searches for a valuation σi that witnesses the satisfiability of δ by using a
time-inverted simulation of D as follows. Concretely, this algorithm numer-
ically simulates D−1, the time-inverted ODE of D, starting from the point
{x 7→ σ′(x)}. If it reaches a point σi that satisfies ψ and if all σi+1 . . . σ′
in the obtained solution satisfy ϕI , then σi witnesses the satisfiability of
δ. If such σi does not exist but there is σi such that σi 6|= ϕI , then ψ is
not backward reachable from σ′ and hence δ is unsatisfiable. In this case,
Algorithm 3 needs to return a predicate that can be used as ψ′ in the rule
ConflictCont in Figure 4. Currently, we assume that the user provides
this predicate. We expect that we can help this step of discovering ψ′ by
using techniques for analyzing continuous dynamics (e.g., automated syn-
thesizer of barrier certificates [34] and Flow* [9] in combination with Craig
interpolant synthesis procedures [2, 31]). If neither holds, then we give up
the verification by aborting; this may happen if, for example, the value of T
is too small.
– Checking whether δ′ := ψ ∧ 〈F (q) | inv (q)〉(ϕ∧ϕc ∧x = σ′(x)) is satisfiable
or not. DetHybridPDR needs to solve this problem in the choice between
Decide andConflict. This query is different from the previous case in that
the formula that appears after 〈F (q) | inv (q)〉 in δ′ is ϕ ∧ ϕc ∧ x = σ′(x),
not x = σ′(x); therefore, we cannot use numerical simulation to discharge
δ′. Although it is possible to adapt Algorithm 3 to maintain the sequence
of predicates α0α1 . . . αT−1 instead of valuations so that each αi becomes
the preimage of αi−1 by D, the preimage computation at each step is pro-
16 Kohei Suenaga and Takuya Ishizawa
Input: Formula ϕ1 ∧ 〈x˙ = f(x) | ϕI〉¬ϕ2 to be discharged; Number r > 0.
Output: Unsat or Otherwise ; if Unsat is returned then the input formula is
unsatisfiable.
1 if ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 is satisfiable then
2 return Otherwise
3 end
4 Let dt be a fresh symbol;
// Checking ϕ1 is invariant throughout the dynamics determined by
x˙ = f (x) and |= ϕ1 =⇒ ¬ϕ2.
5 if r > dt > 0 ∧ ϕ1 ∧ ϕI ∧ ¬[x+ f (x)dt/x]ϕ1 and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 are unsatisfiable then
6 return Unsat
7 end
// Checking ¬ϕ2 is invariant throughout in the dynamics determined
by x˙ = f(x) and |= ϕ1 =⇒ ¬ϕ2.
8 if r > dt > 0 ∧ ¬ϕ2 ∧ ϕI ∧ [x+ f (x)dt/x]ϕ2 and ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 are unsatisfiable then
9 return Unsat
10 end
11 return Otherwise
Algorithm 4: Algorithm for discharging ϕ1 ∧ 〈x˙ = f(x) | ϕI〉¬ϕ2.
hibitively expensive. Instead, the current implementation restricts the input
system so that there exists at most one σ such that σ |= ϕ ∧ ϕc ∧ x = σ′(x)
for any σ′; if this is met, then one can safely use Algorithm 3 for discharging
δ′. Concretely, we allow only ϕc that corresponds to the command whose
syntax is given by c ::= skip | x := r1x+ r2 | x := r1x− r2 where skip is a
command that does nothing; r1 and r2 are real constants.
– Checking whether ϕ1 ∧ 〈D | ϕI〉¬ϕ2 is unsatisfiable. DetHybridPDR
needs to discharge this type of queries when it applies Induction or
PropagateCont. This case is different from the previous case in that
(1) DetHybridPDR may answer Otherwise without aborting the en-
tire verification if unsatisfiability nor satisfiability is proved, and (2)
DetHybridPDR does not need to return a generalization if the given pred-
icate is unsatisfiable. We use Algorithm 4 to discharge this type of queries.
This algorithm first checks the satisfiability of ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 in Step 1; if it is
satisfiable, then so is the entire formula. Then, Step 5 tries to prove that
the entire formula is unsatisfiable by proving (1) ϕ1 is invariant with respect
to the dynamics specified by D and ϕI and (2) ϕ1 ∧ ϕ2 is unsatisfiable.
In order to prove the former, the algorithm tries the following sufficient
condition: For any positive dt that is smaller than a positive real number
r, |= ϕi ∧ ϕI =⇒ [x + f(x)dt/x]ϕ1, where D ≡ x˙ = f(x).6 Step 8
tries the same strategy but tries to prove that ¬ϕ2 is invariant. If both at-
6 This strategy is inspired by the previous work by one of the authors on nonstandard
programming [18, 30, 36, 37].
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tempts fail, then the algorithm returns Otherwise.7 This algorithm could
be further enhanced by incorporating automated invariant-synthesis proce-
dures [15, 28, 35]; exploration of this possibilities is left as future work.
6 Proof-of-concept implementation
We implemented DetHybridPDR as a semi-automated verifier. We note that
the current implementation is intended to be a proof of concept; extensive exper-
iments are left as future work. The snapshot of the source code as of writing can
be found at https://github.com/ksuenaga/HybridPDR/tree/master/src.
The verifier takes a hybrid automaton SH specified with SpaceEx modeling
language [27], the initial location q0, the initial condition ϕ0, and the safety
condition ϕP as input; then, it appliesDetHybridPDR to discover an inductive
invariant or a counterexample. The frontend of the verifier is implemented with
OCaml; in the backend, the verifier uses Z3 [29] and ODEPACK [1] to discharge
verification conditions.
As we mentioned in Section 5.4, when a candidate counterexample 〈q′, σ′, i+ 1〉
turns out to be backward unreachable to Ri, then our verifier asks for a gen-
eralization of σ′ to the user; concretely, for example in an application of the
rule Conflict, the user is required to give ψ such that |= ψ =⇒ ¬σ′ and |=
(q, ϕ, ϕc, q
′) ∈ δ ∧ [x0/x]Ri(q) ∧ 〈[x0/x]F (q) | [x0/x]inv (q)〉[x0/x,x0/x](ϕ ∧
ϕc) =⇒ ψ and |= R0(q
′) =⇒ ψ. Instead of throwing this query at the user in
this form, the verifier asks the following question in order to make this process
easier for the user for each (q, ϕ, ϕc, q
′) ∈ δ:
Pre:Ri(q); Flow:F (q); Stay:inv (q); Guard:ϕ; Cmd:ϕc; CE:σ
′; Init:R0(q′).
In applying ConflictCont, the verifier omits the fields Guard and Cmd.
We applied the verifier to the hybrid automaton in Figure 2 with several
initial conditions and the safety condition ϕP := x ≤ 1. We remark that the
outputs from the verifier presented here are post-processed for readability. We
explain how verification is conducted in each setting; we write D for the ODE
x˙ = −y, y˙ = x.
– Initial condition x = 0∧y = 0 at location q0: The verifier finds the inductive
invariant {q0 7→ x = 0 ∧ y = 0, q1 7→ x = 0 ∧ y = 0} after asking for proofs of
unsatisfiability to the user 5 times.
– Initial condition x ≤ 12 at location q0: The verifier finds a counterexample
{x 7→ 0.490533, y 7→ 1.93995}, from which the system reaches {x 7→ 2.00100, y 7→ 0}.
The verifier asks 5 questions, one of which is the following:
Pre: (x ≤ 1 ∧ y ≥ 0) ∨ x ≤ 0.5; Flow: D; Stay: y ≥ 0;
Guard: y ≤ 0; Cmd: skip; CE: {x 7→ 0.998516; y 7→ −1.889365};
Init: x ≤ 0.5.
7 If the flow specified by D is a linear or a polynomial, then we can apply the procedure
proposed by Liu et al. [28], which is proved to be sound and complete for such a
flow.
18 Kohei Suenaga and Takuya Ishizawa
Notice that the stay condition is y ≥ 0 and the guard is y ≤ 0; therefore
the predicate y = 0 holds when a jump transition happens. Since the flow
specified by D is an anticlockwise circle whose center is {x 7→ 0, y 7→ 0} with
the stay condition y ≥ 0, the states after the flow dynamics followed by a
jump transition is x ≤ 0.5 ∧ y = 0, which indeed does not intersect with
x = 0.998516∧ y = −1.889365. The verification proceeds by giving y ≥ 0 as
a generalization in this case.
– Initial condition 0 ≤ x ≤ 12 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤
1
2 at location q0: The verifier finds an
inductive invariant
R :=
{
q0 7→ (y = 0 ∧ 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.707107)∨ (0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5),
q1 7→ y = 0 ∧ −0.707107 ≤ x ≤ 0
}
after asking for 8 generalizations to the user. This is indeed an inductive
invariant. Noting 0.707107 ≈ 1√
2
, we can confirm that (1) the states that are
reachable by flow dynamics followed by a jump transition is the set denoted
by R(q0); the same holds for the transition from R(q1); (2) it contains the
initial condition 0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5 at location q0; and (3) it does not
intersect with the unsafe region x > 1. The following is one of the questions
that are asked by the verifier:
Pre: (y = 0 ∧−0.707107 ≤ x ≤ 0) ∨ (0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5);
Flow: D; Stay: y ≤ 0; CE: {x 7→ 0.998516; y 7→ −1.889365};
Init: false.
Instead of a precise overapproximation (x2 + y2 = 0.5 ∧ y ≤ 0) ∨ (0 ≤
x ≤ 0.5 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5) of the reachable states, we give (−0.707107 ≤ y ≤
0 ∧ −0.707107 ≤ x ≤ 0.707107) ∨ (0 ≤ x ≤ 0.5 ∧ 0 ≤ y ≤ 0.5), which
progresses the verification.
7 Related work
Compared to its success in software verification [5, 10, 12, 20, 21], IC3/PDR for
hybrid systems is less investigated. HyComp [11, 13] is a model checker that can
use several techniques (e.g., IC3, bounded model checking, and k-induction) in
its backend. Before verifying a hybrid system, HyComp discretizes its flows so
that the verification can be conducted using existing SMT solvers that do not
directly deal with continuous-time dynamics. Compared to HyComp, HGPDR
does not necessarily require prior discretization for verification. We are not aware
of an IC3/PDR-based model checking algorithm for hybrid systems that does
not require prior discretization.
Kindermann et al. [24, 25] propose an application of PDR for a timed system—
a system that is equipped with clock variables ; the flow dynamics of a clock
variable c is limited to c˙ = 1. A clock variable may be also reset to a constant
in a jump transition. Kindermann et al. finitely abstract the state space of clock
variables by using region abstraction [38]. The abstracted system is then verified
using the standard PDR procedure. Later Isenberg et al. [22] propose a method
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that abstracts clock variables by using zone abstraction [4]. They do not deal
with a hybrid system whose flow behavior at each location cannot be described
by c˙ = 1; the system in Figure 2 is out of the scope of their work.
Our continuous-reachability predicates (CRP) are inspired by Platzer’s dL [33].
We may be able to use the theorem prover KeYmaera X for dL predicates [16]
for our purpose of discharging CRP.
8 Conclusion
We proposed an adaptation of GPDR to hybrid systems. For this adaptation, we
extended the logic on which the forward predicate transformer is defined with the
continuous reachability predicates 〈D | ϕI〉ϕ inspired by the differential dynamic
logic dL. The extended forward predicate transformer can precisely express the
behavior of hybrid systems. We formalized our procedure HGPDR and proved
its soundness. We also implemented it as a semi-automated procedure, which
proves the safety of a simple hybrid system in Figure 2.
On top of the current proof-of-concept implementation, we plan to implement
a GPDR-based model checker for hybrid systems. We expect that we need to
improve the heuristic used in the application of the rule Induction, where we
currently check sufficient conditions of the verification condition. We are also
looking at automating part of the work currently done by human in verification;
this is essential when we apply our method to a system with complex continuous-
time dynamics.
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A Proof
A.1 Soundness of Vanilla PDR
In the remainder of this section, we fix a DTSTS SD := 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, δ〉; a predicate
transformer F determined by SD; and a safety condition ϕP to be verified.
Definition A.1. For a frame R, we write JRKq for
∃q′ ∈ Q.(q = q′ ∧R(q′)).
Lemma A.2. Let R0 := F(λq.false). Then, R0(q0) = ϕ0 and R0(qi) = false if
qi 6= q0.
Proof. By the definition of F . The frame R0 is equivalent to λq′.(q′ = q0∧ϕ0) by
Definition 4.1. Therefore, R0(q0) = ϕ0 and R0(qi) = false if qi 6= q0 as required.
Lemma A.3. |= F(R′)(q) =⇒ F(R)(q) for any R and q if |= R′(q) =⇒ R(q)
for any q.
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Proof. Recall the definition of F(R)(q′):
(q′ = q0 ∧ ϕ0) ∨
∨
(q,ϕ,ϕc,q′)∈δ
∃x′′.
(
[x′′/x]R(q)
∧ [x′′/x]ϕ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc
)
.
In the above definition, R(q) appears in the position where the strength of
F(R)(q′) is monotonic with respect to the strength of R(q). Therefore, changing
R to a pointwise-stronger frame R′ strengthens the entire formula as required.
Lemma A.4. If |= F(R′)(q) =⇒ R(q), then |= q = q0 ∧ ϕ0 =⇒ R(q).
Proof. From the definition of F .
Proof of Lemma 4.5: Case analysis on the rules in Figure 3.
Initialize The condition (Con-A) follows from Lemma A.2. The condition (Con-
C) follows from the side condition of Initialize. The other conditions hold
vacuously.
Valid The resulting configuration is consistent as required since it is Valid.
Unfold Let C := M || R0, . . . , RN ;N , Con(C), and Unfold is applied to
this configuration. Let the resulting configuration C′ := ∅ || A[RN+1 :=
λq.true;N := N + 1]. From the side condition of Unfold, we have ∀q ∈
Q. |= RN (q) =⇒ ϕP . We show Con(C′).
– (Con-A) holds since R0 is not unchanged.
– For (Con-B), it is sufficient to show |= JRN Kq =⇒ JRN+1Kq for any
q ∈ Q. By definition, JRN+1Kq is equivalent to ∃q′ ∈ Q.(q = q′), which
is true for any q ∈ Q.
– (Con-C) holds from the above side condition.
– For (Con-D), it is sufficient to prove |= F(RN )(q) =⇒ JRN+1Kq for any
q, which holds since JRN+1Kq is equivalent to ∃q′ ∈ Q.(q = q′).
(Con-E) and (Con-F) hold vacuously.
Induction Let C :=M ||R0, . . . , RN ;N , Con(C), and Induction is applied to
this configuration. Let A be R0, . . . , RN . Then, the resulting configuration C
′
is M ||A[Rj := λq.Rj(q)∧R(q)]
i+1
j=1;N , where |= F(λq.Ri(q)∧R(q))(q) =⇒
R(q) for any q ∈ Q. We show Con(C′).
– (Con-A) holds since R0 is unchanged.
– To prove (Con-B), fix q′′ ∈ Q and i′ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} arbitrarily. We
prove |= JRi′Kq′′ =⇒ JRi′+1Kq′′ . If i′ > 0, then (Con-B) immediately
follows from (Con-B) for C. Only interesting case is i′ = 0, in which we
must show |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒ Jλq.R1(q) ∧R(q)Kq′′ . Since |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒JR1Kq′′ follows from the condition (Con-B) for C, we show |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒
R(q′′), which follows from Lemma A.4 and (Con-A) for C.
– (Con-C) is trivial since Induction strengthen each JRiKq.
– To prove (Con-D), fix j < N and q ∈ Q arbitrarily; we show |= F(R′j)(q) =⇒q
R′j+1
y
q
for R′j and R
′
j+1 in C
′, where R′k is defined as follows:
R′k :=


R0 (k = 0)
λq.Rk(q) ∧R(q) (1 ≤ k ≤ i+ 1)
Rk (i+ 1 < k ≤ N).
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• If j > i+ 1, then (Con-D) for C′ follows from (Con-D) for C.
• If j = i + 1, then we are to prove |= F(λq.Ri+1(q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒
JRi+2Kq. This follows from (Con-D) for C and Lemma A.3.
• If 1 ≤ j < i+ 1, then we are to prove |= F(λq.Rj(q) ∧R(q))(q) =⇒
Jλq.Rj+1(q) ∧R(q)Kq, which is equivalent to (1) |= (q = q0∧ϕ0) =⇒
Rj+1(q)∧R(q) and (2) [x′′/x]Rj(q)∧[x′′/x]R(q)∧[x′′/x]ϕ′∧[x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒
Rj+1(q) ∧ R(q) for any (q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ and x′′. From (Con-D)
for C, we already have |= q = q0 ∧ ϕ0 =⇒ Rj+1(q) and |=
[x′′/x]Rj(q
′) ∧ [x′′/x]ϕ′ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒ Rj+1(q) for any
(q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ and x′′. Therefore, it suffices to show that (1’)
|= (q = q0 ∧ ϕ0) =⇒ R(q) and (2’) |= [x′′/x]Rj(q) ∧ [x′′/x]R(q) ∧
[x′′/x]ϕ′ ∧ [x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒ R(q) for any (q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ and
x′′. The combination of (1’) and (2’) is equivalent to |= F(λq.Rj(q)∧
R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q), which follows from the side condition of Induction,
(Con-B) for C, and Lemma A.3.
• If j = 0, then we are to prove |= F(R0)(q) =⇒ Jλq.R1(q) ∧R(q)Kq,
which is equivalent to |= F(R0)(q) =⇒ (R1(q)∧R(q)). By (Con-D)
for C, it suffices to show |= F(R0)(q) =⇒ R(q). We show (1) |=
F(λq.R0(q)∧R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q) and (2) |= R0(q) =⇒ R0(q)∧R(q);
then (Con-D) for C′ follows from Lemma A.3. (1) follows from the
side condition of Induction, (Con-B) for C, and from Lemma A.3.
(2) follows from Lemma A.4.
(Con-E) and (Con-F) hold vacuously.
Candidate (Con-A), (Con-B), (Con-C), and (Con-D) trivially hold because A
is unchanged. (Con-E) is trivial. (Con-F) holds vacuously.
Decide (Con-A), (Con-B), (Con-C), and (Con-D) trivially hold because A is
unchanged. (Con-E) holds because the N -th element of M is unchanged.
(Con-F) is trivial.
Model Model 〈σ, q0, 0〉M is consistent by definition.
Conflict C = 〈σ′, q′, i+ 1〉M || A and C′ = ∅ || A[Rj ← λq.Rj(q) ∧ R(q)]i+1j=1
where |= R(q′) =⇒ ¬σ′ and ∀q ∈ Q. |= F(Ri)(q) =⇒ R(q). From
the condition ∀q ∈ Q. |= F(Ri)(q) =⇒ R(q) and Lemma A.3, we have
∀q ∈ Q. |= F(λq.Ri(q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q), which is the same as the side
condition for Induction. Notice that the rewriting to a configuration by
Conflict is the same as that of Induction; therefore, the soundness for
this case follows by the same reasoning as the case for Induction.

Proof of Theorem 4.6: Suppose that an execution of GPDR starts from
Initialize and ends at Valid. By Lemma 4.5 and mathematical induction on
the length of the execution, the configuration C just before it reaches Valid is
consistent. Let C be M ||A; then, from the side condition of Valid, there exists
i < N such that ∀q ∈ Q. |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q). For such Ri−1, we have the
following three facts:
– |= R0(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q) for any q ∈ Q from (Con-A) and (Con-B);
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– |= F(Ri−1)(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q) for any q from (Con-B) and (Con-D);
– |= Ri−1(q) =⇒ ϕP for any q ∈ Q from (Con-C).
Therefore, Ri−1 is a fixed point that proves unreachability of ¬ϕP from R0 via
F . This leads to the safety of the system since Lemma 4.2 asserts that F soundly
approximates the dynamics of the DTSTS SD.
On the contrary, suppose an execution of GPDR leads toModel 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉
from Initialize. Let the configuration one step before the final one be C. By
the same discussion as the previous case, C is consistent. We have the following
facts about 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉:
– σ0 |= ϕ0 by (Con-A) and (Con-F);
– From (Con-F), for each
〈
σ(1), q(1), i
〉
and
〈
σ(2), q(2), i+ 1
〉
, there is a transi-
tion from the former to the latter; and
– σN |= ¬ϕP by (Con-E).
Therefore, 〈q0, σ0〉 →δ . . . →δ 〈qN , σN 〉 is a valid trace of SD, which witnesses
that SD is unsafe. 
A.2 Soundness of HGPDR
In the remainder of this section, set SH to 〈Q, q0, ϕ0, F, inv , δ〉, FH and FC to the
forward predicate transformers determined by SH , and ϕP to a safety condition
to be verified.
Lemma A.5. Let R0 := FH(λq.false). Then, R0(q0) = ϕ0 and R0(qi) = false
if qi 6= q0.
Proof. By the definition of FH. The proof is the same argument as that of
Lemma A.2.
Lemma A.6. |= FH(R′)(q) =⇒ FH(R)(q) for any R and q if |= R′(q) =⇒
R(q) for any q.
Proof. By the definition of FH. The proof is the same argument as that of
Lemma A.3.
Lemma A.7. If |= FH(R′)(q) =⇒ R(q), then |= q = q0 ∧ ϕ0 =⇒ R(q).
Proof. From the definition of FH.
Proof of Lemma 5.6: Case analysis on the rules in Figure 4. We omit the
cases whose proof is almost the same as that of Lemma 4.5.
Unfold Let C :=M ||R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ;N , ConH(C), and Unfold is applied
to this configuration. Let the resulting configuration C′ := ∅ || A[RN+1 :=
λq.true, Rrem := λq.true;N := N + 1]. From the side condition of Unfold,
we have ∀q ∈ Q. |= Rrem(q) =⇒ ϕP . We show ConH(C′).
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– For (Con-B), it is sufficient to show |= JRN Kq =⇒ JRN+1Kq for any
q ∈ Q. By definition, JRN+1Kq is equivalent to ∃q′ ∈ Q.(q = q′), which
is true for any q ∈ Q.
– (Con-C) holds from the above side condition and (Con-B-1) and (Con-
B-2).
– For (Con-D-1) and (Con-D-2) are similar to the proof of Lemma 4.5.
(Con-E), (Con-F-1), and (Con-F-2) hold vacuously.
Conflict Same as the proof of Lemma 4.5 wherein we use Lemma A.6 instead
of Lemma A.3.
Induction Let C := M || R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ;N , ConH(C), and Induction is
applied to this configuration. Let A be R0, . . . , RN , Rrem . Then, the re-
sulting configuration C′ is M || A[Rj := λq.Rj(q) ∧ R(q)]i+1j=1;N , where
|= FH(λq.Ri(q) ∧R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q ∈ Q. We show ConH(C′).
– (Con-A) holds since R0 is unchanged.
– To prove (Con-B-1), fix q′′ ∈ Q and i′ ∈ {0, . . . , N − 1} arbitrarily. We
prove |= JRi′Kq′′ =⇒ JRi′+1Kq′′ . If i′ > 0, then (Con-B) immediately
follows from (Con-B) for C. Only interesting case is i′ = 0, in which we
must show |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒ Jλq.R1(q) ∧R(q)Kq′′ . Since |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒JR1Kq′′ follows from the condition (Con-B) for C, we show |= JR0Kq′′ =⇒
R(q′′), which follows from Lemma A.7 and (Con-A) for C.
– (Con-B-2) trivially holds since Induction does not change Rrem .
– (Con-C) is trivial since Induction strengthen each JRiKq.
– To prove (Con-D-1), fix j < N and q ∈ Q arbitrarily; we show |=
FH(R′j)(q) =⇒
q
R′j+1
y
q
for R′j and R
′
j+1 in C
′, where R′k is defined as
follows:
R′k :=


R0 (k = 0)
λq.Rk(q) ∧R(q) (1 ≤ k ≤ i+ 1)
Rk (i+ 1 < k ≤ N).
• If j > i+ 1, then (Con-D-1) for C′ follows from (Con-D-1) for C.
• If j = i+ 1, then we are to prove |= FH(λq.Ri+1(q) ∧R(q))(q) =⇒
JRi+2Kq. This follows from (Con-D-1) for C and Lemma A.6.
• If 1 ≤ j < i+1, then we are to prove |= FH(λq.Rj(q)∧R(q))(q) =⇒
Jλq.Rj+1(q) ∧R(q)Kq, which is equivalent to (1) |= (q = q0∧ϕ0) =⇒
Rj+1(q)∧R(q) and (2) [x′′/x]R(q)∧〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv (q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ∧
[x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒ Jλq.Rj+1(q) ∧R(q)Kq for any (q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ
and x′′. From (Con-D-1) for C, we already have |= q = q0 ∧ ϕ0 =⇒
Rj+1(q) and [x
′′/x]R(q) ∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv(q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧
[x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒ Jλq.Rj+1(q)Kq for any (q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ and
x′′. Therefore, it suffices to show that (1’) |= (q = q0 ∧ ϕ0) =⇒
R(q) and (2’) [x′′/x]R(q) ∧ 〈[x′′/x]F (q) | [x′′/x]inv(q)〉([x′′/x]ϕ ∧
[x/x′,x′′/x]ϕc =⇒ R(q) for any (q′, ϕ′, ϕc, q) ∈ δ and x′′. The
combination of (1’) and (2’) is equivalent to |= F(λq.Rj(q)∧R(q))(q) =⇒
R(q), which follows from the side condition of Induction, (Con-B-1)
for C, and Lemma A.6.
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• If j = 0, then we are to prove |= FH(R0)(q) =⇒ Jλq.R1(q) ∧R(q)Kq,
which is equivalent to |= FH(R0)(q) =⇒ (R1(q) ∧R(q)). By (Con-
B-1) for C, it suffices to show |= FH(R0)(q) =⇒ R(q). We show
(1) |= FH(λq.R0(q) ∧ R(q))(q) =⇒ R(q) and (2) |= R0(q) =⇒
R0(q) ∧ R(q); then (Con-D-1) for C′ follows from Lemma A.6. (1)
follows from the side condition of Induction, (Con-B-1) for C, and
from Lemma A.6. (2) follows from Lemma A.7.
(Con-E) and (Con-F) hold vacuously.
PropagateCont Let C :=M ||R0, . . . , RN , Rrem ;N ,ConH(C), andPropagateCont
is applied to this configuration. Let A be R0, . . . , RN , Rrem . Then, the re-
sulting configuration C′ is M || A[Rrem := λq.Rrem(q) ∧ R(q)], where |=
RN (q) ∨ FC(RN )(q) =⇒ R(q) for any q ∈ Q. We show ConH(C′).
– (Con-A) holds since R0 is unchanged.
– (Con-B-1), (Con-C), and (Con-D-1) trivially hold sincePropagateCont
changes only Rrem .
– To prove (Con-B-2), fix q′′ ∈ Q arbitrarily.We are to prove |= RN (q′′) =⇒
Rrem(q
′′) ∧ R(q′′). From (Con-B-2), it suffices to show |= RN (q′′) =⇒
R(q′′), which follows from the side condition of PropagateCont.
– To prove (Con-D-2), fix q ∈ Q arbitrarily.We are to show |= FC(RN )(q) =⇒
Rrem(q) ∧R(q), which follows from (Con-D-2) for C and the side condi-
tion for PropagateCont.
(Con-E) and (Con-F) hold vacuously.
ConflictCont The argument for this case is almost the same as that ofConflict.

Proof of Theorem 5.7: Suppose that an execution of GPDR starts from
Initialize and ends at Valid. By Lemma 5.6 and mathematical induction on
the length of the execution, the configuration C just before it reaches Valid is
consistent. Let C be M ||A; then, from the side condition of Valid, there exists
i < N such that ∀q ∈ Q. |= Ri(q) =⇒ Ri−1(q). By the same argument as
the proof of Theorem 4.6, we can show that Ri−1 is a fixed point that proves
unreachability of ¬ϕP from R0 via FH. This leads to the safety of the system
since Lemma 5.3 asserts that FH soundly approximates the dynamics of the HA
SH .
On the contrary, suppose an execution of GPDR leads to
Model 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉 〈σrem , qN , rem〉
from Initialize. Let the configuration one step before the final one be C. By
the same discussion as the previous case, C is consistent. We have the following
facts about 〈σ0, q0, 0〉 . . . 〈σN , qN , N〉 〈σrem , qN , rem〉:
– σ0 |= ϕ0 by (Con-A) and (Con-F);
– From (Con-F-1), for each
〈
σ(1), q(1), i
〉
and
〈
σ(2), q(2), i+ 1
〉
, there is a tran-
sition from the former to the latter;
– From (Con-F-2), for each
〈
σ(1), q(1), N
〉
and
〈
σ(2), q(2), rem
〉
, there is a con-
tinuous transition from the former to the latter; and
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– σN |= ¬ϕP by (Con-E).
Therefore, the run that consists of 〈q0, σ0〉 . . . 〈qN , σN 〉 〈qrem , σrem〉 is a valid
trace of SH , which witnesses that SH is unsafe. 
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ĂƚĂ
ĂƚĂ
q0x ≥ 0 ∧ sum = 0 q1
x > 0 ∧ sum′ = sum+ x ∧ x′ = x− 1
x ≤ 0
q0x ≥ 0 ∧ sum = 01
x > 0
sum := sum+ x
x := x− 1
≤
